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Despite widespread popular concern that American households are not saving properly 
for retirement, it is typically difficult to demonstrate that a household’s savings decisions are 
suboptimal. The lifecycle savings problem is sufficiently complex and economic theory 
sufficiently rich that few restrictions can be imposed on the range of savings behaviors we 
should observe in the absence of mistakes; nearly any choice can be theoretically justified by 
some combination of preferences and information unobserved by the econometrician.  
In this paper, we identify a sizeable group of employees whose observable choice set in 
an important retirement savings vehicle, the 401(k), includes actions that are clearly precluded 
by normative economic theory. These individuals, who are over 59½ years old, have their 401(k) 
contributions matched by their employer; that is, for every dollar they contribute up to a certain 
threshold, their employer will make an additional proportional contribution. Furthermore, they 
have virtually unconstrained access to their 401(k) balances because their companies allow 
employees over 59½ to make discretionary1, penalty-free2, in-service3 401(k) withdrawals. For 
these individuals, a contribution rate below the match threshold is a dominated strategy.  
Nevertheless, we find that many of these employees are not contributing up to the match 
threshold.  We calculate a lower bound on the welfare losses for these below-threshold 
employees by computing the difference between the payoffs to their current savings strategy and 
one which clearly dominates. 
The dominating strategy we consider for these below-threshold employees is increasing 
their contribution rate up to the match threshold. This incremental contribution triggers an 
instantaneous windfall gain because of the employer match. The employee then immediately 
withdraws the incremental contribution. This strategy, which we will refer to as the “withdrawal 
strategy,” has no impact on the employee’s non-401(k) finances and hence need not affect 
current levels of consumption. However, it increases the employee’s 401(k) balance by the 
amount of the incremental contribution multiplied by the employer match rate. Because this 
withdrawal strategy is not necessarily the globally optimal strategy for the employee, the 
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increased 401(k) balance represents a lower bound on the welfare gain available to the employee 
if she perfectly optimized. 
The lower bound on welfare loss can be substantial. Consider a 60-year-old employee 
who does not currently contribute to her 401(k) plan but whose company would match her 
contributions dollar-for-dollar up to 5% of her salary. If her biweekly salary is $2,000, then the 
incremental value of contributing up to the match threshold is bounded below at $2,000 × 5% = 
$100 every two weeks. Executing the withdrawal strategy, she would end up with an extra 
$2,600 in her 401(k) account each year. Alternatively, if the firm allows it, she could withdraw 
the $2,600 in employer matching contributions as well and increase her consumption by $2,600 
per year without decreasing her assets relative to her non-contributing strategy. 
Despite the large gains from contributing up to the employer match threshold, we find 
that roughly half of our sample of older employees picks a dominated contribution rate below the 
match threshold. We refer to those employees contributing less than the match threshold who 
could profitably benefit from the withdrawal strategy described above as “undersavers.” (We use 
this term narrowly for those whose 401(k) contributions are too low; we do not mean to imply 
that these employees are necessarily saving too little in a normative sense, since it may be 
optimal for them to follow the withdrawal strategy and use the proceeds to increase their current 
consumption while leaving their savings path unchanged.) The average annual welfare loss 
found among these “undersavers” is 1.3% of their yearly salary.  
The fact that so many employees in our sample fail to take full advantage of the employer 
match is surprising because one would a priori expect this population to be particularly eager to 
contribute to their 401(k). Since they are at least 59½ years old, the need for retirement savings 
should be salient to them. Having decades of experience managing their money, they should be 
more financially savvy than their younger counterparts. And, with an average of 14.3 years of 
tenure at their respective companies, they have had ample time to familiarize themselves with 
their 401(k) plans. 
To better understand why these employees do not take full advantage of their 401(k) 
match, we analyze a combined survey/field experiment conducted jointly with Hewitt 
Associates, the benefits administration and consulting firm that supplied our 401(k) data. Survey 
responses indicate that neither perceived direct transactions costs nor satiation explain the failure 
to contribute to the match threshold. Rather, undersavers appear to be much less financially 
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sophisticated and knowledgeable about their firm’s 401(k) plan. Nevertheless, explaining the 
foregone opportunity—while highlighting the fact that there is no loss of liquidity from 
contributing up to the match threshold—produces only an infinitesimal response, raising 401(k) 
contribution rates by one tenth of one percentage point relative to a control group. Evidence that 
undersavers are more prone to delay taking other profitable actions suggests that time-
inconsistent preferences may also play a role in undermining optimal contribution choices. 
 The paper proceeds as follows. Section I describes our data and the procedures we used 
to select our sample. Section II discusses how we identify suboptimal savers and the 
methodology we use to calculate a lower bound on their welfare losses. Section III presents the 
welfare loss calculation results and compares the 401(k) contribution behavior of employees over 
59½ years of age with their younger coworkers. Section IV presents the survey/field experiment 
and discusses potential reasons why undersavers are reluctant to contribute up to the match 
threshold. Section V concludes by evaluating the efficacy of educational interventions and 
monetary incentives for raising the savings rate of low savers. 
 
I. Data description 
Our data come from Hewitt Associates, a large benefits administration and consulting 
firm. The sample consists of a series of year-end cross-sections on all employees at seven firms 
from 1998 through 2002.4 These cross-sections contain demographic information such as birth 
date, hire date, gender, state of residence, and compensation. The cross-sections also contain 
point-in-time information on 401(k) savings outcomes, including participation status in the plan, 
date of first participation, the year-end contribution rate, and total balances. In addition, the 
cross-sections have annual flow measures on individual and employer contributions to the 401(k) 
plan, early withdrawals from the 401(k) plan, and the total transfer of assets across the funds in 
the plan. 
The seven firms were selected because they offer an employer match and it is possible for 
employees over the age of 59½ to make discretionary, penalty-free, in-service withdrawals. 
Specifically, these firms (1) offered a matching contribution proportional to the employee’s own 
contribution up to a threshold, and (2) allowed employees older than 59½ to make 401(k) 
withdrawals for any reason while employed without an ensuing freeze on contributions. The 
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companies span many different industries: consumer products, electronics, health care, 
manufacturing, technology, transportation, and utilities.  
Table 1 summarizes the 401(k) plan rules at our seven companies. The maximum gain 
from the company match in our sample is 6% of annual salary for a subsample of employees at 
Company A who are matched at a 100% rate up to 6% of their pay. Company C offers the 
smallest potential gain of 0.75% of annual salary, as it only matches 25 cents per dollar for the 
first 3% of pay contributed to the 401(k) plan. 
 Employees do not have access to their employer match money until it is vested. If an 
employee is only 80% vested when he leaves the company, he forfeits 20% of the balances 
accrued in his employer match account. If the employer allows withdrawals from the employer 
match account, an employee can only withdraw the vested amount. The fraction of employer 
match money vested is typically a function of an employee’s tenure at the company. Companies 
C, F, and G use a graded vesting schedule in which the fraction of match balances vested 
increases gradually with years of service until the employee is 100% vested. In contrast, 
Companies A, B, and E have cliff vesting schedules in which employees are not vested at all 
before achieving five years of tenure and are 100% vested thereafter. Employer match 
contributions at Company D are fully vested immediately. Four of the companies with graded or 
cliff vesting schedules fully vest employees who reach a certain age even if they would not be 
fully vested based on their tenure (Companies B, C, E and G). 
 Not being vested can eliminate an undersaver’s gains from contributing up the match 
threshold. If an employee is not vested and knows that she will leave the company before 
becoming even partially vested, then the additional employer match reaped is worth nothing to 
her. We do not wish to count such employees as foregoing a free lunch. We describe our 
methodology for accounting for vesting in Section II. 
 Time and effort are costly, so withdrawals must be easy to execute, since this is the only 
part of the withdrawal strategy that must be actively executed by the employee once it has been 
initiated (contributions to the 401(k) are automatically deducted from each paycheck). Easy 
withdrawals are available at all of our companies; participants can request withdrawals by calling 
a toll-free number. Four of our companies’ plan documents include check processing times; three 
indicate that they issue checks within a week of the request, and the fourth mails checks in two to 
three weeks. We show in Section IV that employees do not believe transactions in their 401(k) to 
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be particularly time-consuming. Furthermore, the monetary costs of withdrawing once every 
three months rather than every pay cycle are trivial for reasonable costs of capital, so any effort 
required to withdraw money can be expended infrequently.5 These minimal costs of delay also 
imply that the minimum withdrawal amount or maximum withdrawal frequency restrictions that 
some of our companies impose are of little consequence. 
 Table 2 reports summary demographic statistics as of year-end 1998 for the 6,483 active 
employees in our sample who were older than 59½ and eligible to receive matching 
contributions at the beginning of 1998. For the sake of comparison, we also present demographic 
statistics on the 401(k)-match-eligible population under the age of 59½ at these firms. 
 
II. Calculating a Lower Bound for Welfare Losses 
We calculate a lower bound on the welfare losses that accrue to undersavers by taking the 
difference between the match contributions they actually received in 1998 and the maximum 
possible match they could have received based on their compensation, the employer matching 
formula, and the IRS contribution limits.6 This represents the additional 401(k) balances they 
would have accrued (before capital gains) by following the withdrawal strategy described in the 
introduction. There are two relevant IRS contribution limits. First, IRS section 402(g)(3) sets a 
maximum dollar limit on elective deferrals which was $10,000 per year in 1998 (this limit has 
been increased in subsequent years). Second, IRS section 415(b)(1)(A) precludes employee 
401(k) contributions out of compensation above a certain amount, which was set at $160,000 in 
1998 (this threshold has also been increased in subsequent years). In a plan that matches 100% of 
contributions up to 5% of salary, an employee who earned $200,000 in 1998 could only receive a 
maximum of $8,000 that year in matching contributions ($160,000 × 0.05). We take both of 
these restrictions into account when calculating the losses that accrue to undersavers.7 
 As mentioned above, an employee’s valuation of the match that she could have received 
by contributing up to the match threshold may be significantly affected by her vesting status and 
consequently the length of her future tenure at the company. The employer match is worthless 
for an employee who is currently completely unvested and knows she will leave the company 
before she is even partially vested.8 On the other hand, the employer match should be fully 
valued if the currently unvested employee is completely confident that she will stay at the 
company until she is fully vested. 
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 Because we do not know each employee’s subjective probability of leaving the company, 
we adopt two different approaches to incorporate vesting into our loss calculations. The first 
method is an ex ante measure in which the loss from not contributing to the employer match 
threshold is calculated as the employer match foregone multiplied by the participant’s vested 
percentage at the time of the contribution.9 For example, consider an employee in a firm with a 
dollar-for-dollar match up to 5% of pay whose vesting percentage increases from 0% to 20% on 
July 1, 1998. In calculating the 401(k) losses in calendar year 1998, this ex ante approach would 
not include any foregone match on contributions made prior to July 1, 1998. After this date, 
when the employee’s vesting percentage increases to 20%, her calculated losses are only 20% of 
the foregone employer match. So if this hypothetical employee contributed 2% of her salary 
every pay period, then her losses for the year as a fraction of her annual salary would be defined 
as  
( )( ) ( )1 10% 5% 2% 100% 20% (5% 2%) 100% 0.3%
2 2
× − × + × − × = . 
Note that this calculation will understate expected losses by ignoring all continuation values 
from contributing to the plan. 
 Our second approach to calculating losses uses the employee’s actual realized 
employment history at the company to calculate the ex post loss from not contributing to the 
match threshold in 1998. In other words, we calculate expected losses under the assumption that 
employees have perfect foresight about how long they will stay at their company. In the example 
above, if the employee left the company at some later date having been 80% vested in her 
employer match account, her calculated loss for 1998 would be 
( )( ) ( )1 180% 5% 2% 100% 80% (5% 2%) 100% 2.4%
2 2
× − × + × − × = . 
Note that the ex post loss calculation will be at least as large as the ex ante loss calculation, and a 
greater fraction of employees will be classified as “ex post undersavers” than “ex ante 
undersavers.”10 
When withdrawing money from the 401(k) plans of Companies A, D, and F, after-tax 
accounts must be depleted first. For employees at these companies who have accrued significant 
capital gains in their after-tax accounts, executing the withdrawal strategy may cause them to pay 
taxes on those capital gains earlier than they would have otherwise. Only 9% of employees older 
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than 59½ and under the threshold at these three firms have after-tax account balances. In order to 
avoid having to calculate the loss due to any capital gains tax that may be associated with the 
withdrawal strategy, we simply do not classify as an undersaver anybody at these three firms 
who had a positive balance in his or her after-tax account at year-end 1998, regardless of his or 
her 401(k) contribution rate or the potential size of the capital gain in the after-tax account. This 
conservative assumption leads us to understate the fraction of employees who are foregoing free 
lunches.  
 
III. Welfare Loss Results 
 Table 3 reports the frequency and magnitude of ex ante and ex post undersaving in 1998. 
Using the ex ante loss calculation, 49% of match-eligible employees over 59½ at our seven firms 
are not fully exploiting the employer match despite being currently vested. Of these, 79% are not 
contributing to the 401(k) plan at all. The remaining 21% are participating in the 401(k) plan but 
contributing below the match threshold. The resulting average loss is substantial, ranging from 
0.8% to 2.2% of annual salary across the seven firms with a corresponding annual dollar loss 
between $131 and $755. The average loss across all seven firms is 1.3% of annual salary, or 
$256. The aggregate dollars foregone constitute 18.4% of the maximum employer match dollars 
potentially available to employees over 59½ at the seven firms. 
 When using the ex post loss measure, the fraction of undersavers and the size of their 
losses increase, as expected. However, the differences between the ex ante and ex post losses are 
not large. Only an additional 5.3% of employees are counted as undersavers using the ex post 
loss definition, and the average annual loss is only $2.35 higher than the average ex ante loss. 
The reason for this similarity is that 83% of employees over 59½ years old are fully vested as of 
January 1, 1998, and most of the others are almost fully vested. Hence, for most employees over 
age 59½, the ex ante value of the employer match is the same as or close to its ex post value. 
 Four of the seven firms in our sample invest the match in employer stock and restrict 
diversification.11 Since a match in employer stock is worth less than a match that can be 
diversified, our calculations for these four companies overstate the potential welfare loss.12 
However this bias is likely to be small. First, in our sample of firms, the four firms with 
employer stock restrictions have the four lowest fractions of ex ante undersavers, so the 
restriction does not appear to be driving our results. Second, the diversification restrictions only 
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partially affect the employees in our analysis. Two of the four firms allow diversification after a 
two-year holding period; one allows diversification after age 50; and the last of the four allows 
salaried employees to diversify half of the match after age 55. Recall that all of the employees in 
our sample are at least 59½ years old. 
 Even after accounting for any discount employees might place on a match in employer 
stock, Table 3 is likely to grossly understate the cumulative magnitude of the welfare losses 
because the loss is calculated over only one year. Most of the undersavers in our sample have 
had several years of tenure with their firm since age 59½, and over half have never participated 
in their company’s 401(k) plan.13 Thus, they have forefeited matching contributions for many 
years. We do not attempt an exact calculation of these cumulative amounts because doing so 
would require information on 401(k) eligibility, the 401(k) match, and employee compensation 
before 1998, which we do not have. 
 Table 4 presents the results of using a much simpler definition of losses than that in Table 
3. The full amount of any matching contribution foregone is considered a loss, without regard to 
the employee’s vesting status or the impact of capital gains taxes on after-tax account 
withdrawals. We refer to all employees contributing below the match threshold in Table 4 as 
“sub-match savers.”  The conceptual distinction between “sub-match savers” and “undersavers” 
is simply whether with withdrawal strategy can be profitably employed.  For reasons discussed 
earlier, some of the “sub-match savers” in Table 4 are not necessarily saving suboptimally 
(“undersaving”) because they may never get access to their match balances.14   
 We present Table 4 for two purposes. First, we would like to compare the behavior of 
employees older than 59½ to that of employees younger than 59½. However, the withdrawal 
strategy discussed in this paper is not available to employees younger than 59½ because they 
must both demonstrate financial hardship and pay a 10% tax penalty to withdraw money from 
their 401(k).15 Thus, the notional idea of the ex ante or ex post losses calculated in Table 3 for 
employees older than 59½ does not extend to younger workers. We can, however, make an 
apples-to-apples comparison of older and younger employees if we simply consider the total 
matching contributions that are foregone. Second, other 401(k) datasets may not contain all of 
the information needed to calculate ex ante and ex post losses. The simpler measure in Table 4 
allows for easier comparability of this paper’s results with tabulations from other similar data 
sources. 
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 The top half of Table 4 presents statistics on employees older than 59½. 56.7% of 
employees over 59½ are sub-match savers. Recall that 49.0% of employees are ex ante 
undersavers (Table 3), so almost all sub-match savers are in fact undersavers. The $263 average 
sub-match saver loss is only slightly higher than the ex ante undersaving loss as well.  
 The bottom half of Table 4 presents statistics on employees younger than 59½. 
Interestingly, the fraction of sub-match savers is quite similar for the younger and older 
employees: 53.9% versus 56.7%. The composition of their behavior is different, however. 
Younger sub-match savers tend to contribute positive amounts that are less than the match 
threshold, whereas most older sub-match savers fail to contribute anything at all to the 401(k). 
Although the fraction of younger sub-match savers is lower than the fraction of older sub-match 
savers, the $450 annual average loss for younger sub-match savers is much larger. The larger 
losses for younger employees are due to their higher salary (see Table 2), as their average loss as 
a fraction of pay is actually slightly lower (1.30% versus 1.35%). 
 Figure 1 plots the fraction of sub-match savers, ex ante undersavers, and ex post 
undersavers by age. Consistent with the results in Tables 3 and 4, the three series track each 
other closely for ages above 59½. Over the entire working life, the sub-match saver series is U-
shaped: the fraction of sub-match savers declines with age until the mid-50s and increases 
thereafter. One might have expected a discrete drop in the fraction of sub-match savers at age 
59½, when the 401(k) becomes very close to a liquid asset. That the failure to exploit the 401(k) 
match begins to increase at precisely the time when the economic reasons for participation 
become most compelling is surprising. This may arise from a selection effect generated by low 
savers who are less able to afford to retire and thus remain in the labor force longer. 
Alternatively, this phenomenon may reflect consumption smoothing by older employees whose 
wages are falling and who are unaware of the 401(k) withdrawal privileges available only to 
older workers (Table 2 shows that the older employees have lower wages than their younger 
counterparts). We discuss other potential explanations for older workers’ failure to exploit the 
401(k) match in Section IV.  
 Table 5 presents the results of probit regressions for the likelihood that employees fail to 
exploit the full employer match. The sample in the first three regressions is employees older than 
59½. The dependent variables are dummies for being an ex ante undersaver, being an ex post 
undersaver, and being a sub-match saver, respectively. The sample in the fourth regression is 
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match-eligible employees under 59½, and the dependent variable is a dummy for being a sub-
match saver. Both the probit coefficients and marginal effects (slopes) at the sample means are 
reported. 
 We find that men are 5 to 8 percentage points more likely to forego matching 
contributions than women, while the married are 4 to 7 percentage points less likely to forego 
matching contributions. Those with higher pay are substantially less likely to leave match money 
on the table. Among younger employees, age is negatively related to leaving money on the table, 
while the reverse is true for older employees, a pattern consistent with Figure 1. Finally, those 
with higher tenure are less likely to forego matching contributions. The one exception to this 
result is in the ex ante undersaver regression for those over age 59½. This anomaly is explained 
by the fact that individuals with very low tenure are much more likely to be completely unvested 
and thus not classified as ex ante undersavers. 
 
IV. Survey/Field Experiment 
Given the low direct costs of initiating 401(k) participation, it is quite striking that such a 
high fraction of employees forfeit employer matching contributions, especially among workers 
over age 59½.  
 To gain further insight into why employees are contributing suboptimally to their 401(k), 
and to see if providing information about the matching opportunities would increase 401(k) 
savings, we conducted a field experiment at Company A in partnership with Hewitt Associates. 
On August 3 and 4, 2004, we mailed treatment and control surveys to 889 Company A 
employees over the age of 59½.16 All surveys were accompanied by a cover letter printed on the 
employer’s letterhead. The 889-person sample includes all 689 employees at Company A who 
were contributing less than the match threshold as of the beginning of August 2004, as well as 
200 randomly selected employees contributing at or above the match threshold. 
We (unevenly) divided our sample of 889 employees into two subgroups: a control group 
and a treatment group. We sent control surveys to approximately half of the employees 
contributing below the match threshold (344 selected at random from the population of 889) and 
to 200 randomly selected employees contributing at or above the match threshold. This control 
survey included questions about the employee’s satisfaction with and knowledge about the 
401(k) plan, general financial literacy, and savings preferences. 
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We sent treatment surveys to the other 345 employees contributing below the match 
threshold. The treatment survey was identical to the control survey, except that it included an 
additional five questions at the end (Questions 26 through 30). The survey is reproduced in 
Appendix A. Question 26 explains that the company matched the first 6% of salary contributed 
to the 401(k). Question 27 explains that transactions in the 401(k) could be made via the Internet, 
a touch-tone phone system, or by speaking to a benefits center representative on the phone. 
Question 28 explains that penalty-free withdrawals from the 401(k) are available for any reason 
for participants over age 59½. Question 29 asks respondents to calculate the amount of employer 
match money they would lose each year if they did not contribute to the 401(k) (respondents 
received a matrix of match amounts corresponding to various match rates and salaries to aid in 
this calculation; see Appendix A). Question 30 asks if the employee is interested in raising his 
contribution rate to 6% in light of the losses calculated in question 29. We estimate that it would 
take employees about 15 minutes to complete the control survey and 18 minutes to complete the 
treatment survey. 
For 200 employees in each of the three groups (below the match threshold control group, 
above the match threshold control group, below the match threshold treatment group), we 
included a $1 bill with the survey and promised to send them a $50 American Express Gift 
Cheque if they responded no later than August 27, 2004 in an enclosed postage-paid envelope. 
The cover letter that accompanied the survey is reproduced in Appendix B. 
Respondents from the remaining 289 people below the match threshold who received the 
survey were entered into a raffle, along with all respondents younger than 59½, for a personal 
digital assistant, an MP3 player, and a digital camera.17,18 Gift Cheques were sent and raffle 
prizes awarded on September 17, 2004. 
 A total of 232 employees responded—128 contributing below the match threshold and 
104 contributing at or above the match threshold—resulting in an overall response rate of 26%.19 
Interestingly, the response rate among employees contributing at or above the match threshold 
was much higher (52%) than among employees below the threshold (19%), even though the 
former group’s median income is higher than the latter’s. Apparently, the difference in 
employees’ willingness/ability to collect cheap money in 401(k) accounts extends to other 
domains.  
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 We first examine whether perceived transactions costs keep employees from exploiting 
the employer match. Responses to Question 3 of the survey indicate that in general, respondents 
do not believe that joining the 401(k) plan and conducting transactions in it are time-consuming. 
The average respondent who was not participating in the 401(k) plan believed that it would take 
1.7 hours to join the plan, 1.3 hours to change their plan contribution rate for the first time, and 
1.5 hours to change their plan asset allocation for the first time. The average respondent who is 
actually in the 401(k) plan reported lower averages of 1.4, 0.6, and 0.6 hours, respectively. 
Consistent with these responses, none of the employees who claimed in question 23 that they did 
not ever plan on enrolling in the 401(k) cited in question 25 the time it takes to enroll as a reason 
for non-participation. Therefore, the perceived time costs of conducting transactions in the 
401(k) are not enough to justify the large amounts of money employees below the match 
threshold forego. Our survey does not measure the indirect transactions costs of 401(k) 
participation, namely the costs of figuring out one’s optimal 401(k) contribution rate and asset 
allocation. The evidence on financial literacy discussed below indicates that these may be 
substantial. 
We now consider whether those who were not contributing up to the match threshold felt 
little need to save more for retirement. Is their current wealth high enough that there is little 
value to further increasing consumption during retirement? This possibility is rejected by the 
data. Consistent with other survey evidence on the relationship between actual and perceived-to-
be-optimal savings rates (see, for example, Choi et al. (2002), Bernheim (1995), and Farkas and 
Johnson (1997)), 86% of employees below the match threshold and 70% of employees at or 
above the match threshold do not think they are saving enough, according to Question 16. Those 
under the threshold report in Question 15 an average actual savings rate of 7.4% but believe they 
should be saving 17.1%. The corresponding averages for those at or above the threshold are 
15.3% and 20.0%, respectively.20 Remarkably, among respondents who think they should be 
saving more, only 33% of those below the threshold and 22% of those at or above the threshold 
report being unable to do so in Question 16; the remainder claim they could afford to save at 
least $520 more per year ($10 per week).  
 Having ruled out several mechanisms that might explain why so many employees fail to 
fully exploit their employer match, what does matter? We find striking differences in financial 
literacy between undersavers and those contributing at or above the match threshold. For 
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example, only 8% of undersavers report themselves to be a very or relatively knowledgeable 
investor, compared to 20% of those at or above the match threshold. This self-perceived lack of 
financial expertise is borne out in the answers to more objective questions on financial literacy. 
For example, in their response to Question 20, 53% of employees below the match threshold 
incorrectly believe their own employer’s stock to be less risky than a large U.S. stock mutual 
fund. Only 26% of employees at or above the threshold share this erroneous belief.21 Employees 
below the threshold are less knowledgeable about their 401(k) plan features. In Question 4, only 
21% were able to correctly state their employer match rate, and only 27% were able to correctly 
state the match threshold. In contrast, employees at or above the threshold were able to correctly 
state these figures 41% and 59% of the time, respectively. 
Our survey responses also suggest that procrastination22 plays some role in driving the 
undersaving that we observe. Recall that a much higher proportion of employees at or above the 
threshold (52%) than employees below the threshold (19%) collected $50 for completing our 15-
minute survey, even though the former group’s median income is higher than the latter’s. In 
addition, among survey respondents, the average respondent contributing at least up to the match 
threshold took 15.1 days to mail the survey back to us, while the average respondent below the 
threshold took 17.2 days. Finally, in Question 10, we find that fewer respondents at or above the 
match threshold (11%) than respondents under the threshold (16%) report themselves to often or 
almost always leave things to the last minute. This gap is likely to understate the true difference 
in self-perceived procrastination between the two groups since the sample is right-truncated; the 
inveterate delayers never returned the survey and so did not answer Question 10. 
The primary purpose of the survey was to see how much undersavers would increase 
their 401(k) contributions if the benefits of the employer match and the penalty-free, 
discretionary withdrawal rules were explained to them. Recall that we implemented a treatment 
condition that added Questions 26 through 30 to the baseline survey. The median respondent to 
Question 29 calculated that she would lose $1,200 each year by not contributing to the match 
threshold.23  
Table 6 presents the average 401(k) contribution rates on August 1, 2004 (immediately 
prior to the survey mailing) and November 1, 2004 (approximately two months after the 
response deadline) for employees who were under the match threshold at the time of the survey 
mailing.24 The average contribution rates of the control group and the treatment group increase 
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over this period, but by a very small amount (0.08% of pay for the control group and 0.16% of 
pay for the treatment group).25 The average difference in the contribution rate changes between 
the two groups was only 0.08% of pay and statistically insignificant. Using receipt of the 
treatment survey as an instrument for reading and returning the treatment survey, we estimate the 
treatment effect to be a 0.53 percentage points increase in the contribution rate (t-statistic 0.87). 
Consistent with other financial education research that tracks participant behavior in 
administrative data (Madrian and Shea (2005), Choi et al. (2002), Duflo and Saez (2003)), it 
appears that giving workers information does not meaningfully raise their 401(k) contribution 
rates, even when the recommended action exploits a free lunch. We should acknowledge, 
however, that the results here are for a selected sample. Individuals older than 59½ years who are 
not contributing up to their 401(k) match threshold may be particularly insensitive to financial 
education. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
Despite the presence of employer matching contributions in 401(k) plans, a substantial 
fraction of employees fails to contribute up to their employer’s match threshold. For many 
employees it is possible to rationalize their willingness to leave employer 401(k) matching 
contributions on the table by appealing to factors such as liquidity constraints, early withdrawal 
penalties, and incomplete vesting. In this paper, we examine the 401(k) savings choices of a 
group of employees for whom these explanations do not apply. These employees are older than 
59½, receive employer matching contributions, are largely fully vested, and can withdraw their 
401(k) balances at any time (with no tax penalty). For these employees, contributing below the 
match threshold is a dominated strategy. Nevertheless, half of them do so. The average foregone 
match in 1998 is over $250, or 1.3% of annual pay. The foregone match over a longer time 
horizon is likely much larger. 
We examine several possible explanations for this population’s failure to optimally 
exploit the employer match. Based on survey evidence, we rule out direct transactions costs and 
satiation. We find evidence that employees who fail to exploit the employer match are less 
financially literate than those at or above the match threshold, which may indicate substantial 
indirect transactions costs (i.e., decision-making costs) associated with 401(k) participation. We 
also find evidence for procrastination. 
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Many financial education interventions are intended to increase savings rates by 
describing the benefits of saving. Consistent with previous evidence, our survey finds that most 
employees already believe that they should be saving more than they currently are. However, 
even though employees think they should save more, our effort to facilitate such savings had no 
effect. This is intriguing because we described a highly profitable savings strategy that generates 
no liquidity costs. The failure to induce employees to exploit a significant arbitrage opportunity 
leads us to be pessimistic about other educational interventions promoting savings strategies that 
aren’t as easy or costless to pursue. Some employees apparently need more than good advice to 
get them to save. We note, though, that the group we study may be a particularly intractable 
population.  
Our results are also cause for pessimism about the ability of monetary incentives alone to 
increase savings in the left tail of the savings distribution. Despite offering costly matching 
programs with strong marginal incentives, the firms studied here were able to induce only half of 
their older employees to contribute up to the match threshold.  Although matching alone does not 
appear sufficient to increase savings in the left tail, it may be more effective when combined 
with other interventions that account for employee passivity (Madrian and Shea (2001), Benartzi 
and Thaler (2004), Choi, et al. (2002 and 2004a, b)) or that sharply reduce the complexity of the 
401(k) participation decision (Choi, et al. (2005), Duflo, et al. (2005), Mitchell, Utkus, and Yang 
(2005)). 
Finally, the results in this paper speak more generally to the role of the no-arbitrage 
condition in economic equilibria. Among the population studied in this paper, unexploited 
arbitrage opportunities are commonly observed, despite the fact that the potential gains are large 
and the necessary strategy to capitalize on these gains is simple and widely socially encouraged. 
Our evidence suggests that in non-market domains like retirement saving where the failure to 
maximize cannot be exploited by others, arbitrage opportunities may persist in equilibrium. 
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Appendix A: Treatment Survey 
1. What percentage of your pay are you currently contributing to your 401(k)? If you 
aren’t contributing, write “0” in the blank. Don’t count employer contributions to 
your plan. 
(a) Before-tax contributions:      % of pay   I don’t know 
(b) After-tax contributions:        % of pay    I don’t know  
 
2. For each statement, please check the box that best represents your views. 
 
  Strongly      Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Neither Agree 
nor Disagree
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(a) I have enough information 
about the rules of my 401(k) 
          
(b) I have a good under-
standing of the investment 
choices my 401(k) offers           
(c) I’m satisfied with the 
investment choices my 
401(k) offers           
(d) My 401(k) meets my 
retirement needs 
          
(e) I’d rather save for 
retirement in my 401(k) than 
outside my 401(k)           
(f) My company’s 401(k) plan 
is better than other 
companies’ 401(k) plans           
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3. We want to know how long it took you to do certain things in the 401(k) for the first 
time. If you haven’t done these things, we want to know how long you think they 
would take you. Check the appropriate box and fill in the blanks for each of parts (a) 
through (c). 
 
(a) It  would take me/  actually took me about       hours and       
minutes to join my 401(k) plan. 
 
(b) It  would take me/  actually took me about       hours and       
minutes to change my contribution rate for the first time after joining the 401(k) plan. 
 
(c) It  would take me/  actually took me about       hours and       
minutes to change the funds I’m invested in for the first time after joining the 401(k) 
plan 
 
 
We want to find out how well your company has communicated its 401(k) plan 
features to you. Please answer the questions without looking at your 401(k) plan 
documents. 
 
4. Please fill in the following blanks, or indicate that you don’t know the answer. 
 
For every before-tax dollar I contribute to the 401(k) up to      % of my salary, my 
employer makes a matching contribution to the plan of       cents. 
 
             I don’t know how much my employer matches my contributions 
             
5. Does your company’s 401(k) plan offer the following investment options? 
(a) US stock market fund       Yes       No      I don’t know 
(b) Stable value fund       Yes       No      I don’t know   
(c) Bond fund       Yes       No      I don’t know 
(d) Commodities fund    Yes       No      I don’t know 
(e) International stock fund     Yes       No      I don’t know 
(f) Your employer’s stock     Yes       No      I don’t know 
(g) Real estate investment trust   Yes       No      I don’t know 
 
6. Which of the following statements best describes your beliefs about the withdrawal 
rules that currently apply to you in your 401(k)? (Please check only one box.) 
    If I have money in my 401(k), I can’t withdraw it 
  If I have money in my 401(k), I can withdraw it, but I will pay taxes plus a 
penalty on the withdrawal 
  If I have money in my 401(k), I can withdraw it without any penalty, but I will 
pay taxes on the withdrawal 
  I don’t know 
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7. Which of the following statements best describes your beliefs about the loan rules 
that currently apply to you in your 401(k)? (Please check only one box.) 
  If I have money in my 401(k), I can’t take out any loans from it 
  If I have money in my 401(k), I can have a limited number of loans from it at one 
time 
   If I have money in my 401(k), I can take out as many loans as I want from it at a 
time 
  I don’t know 
 
8. How knowledgeable an investor would you consider yourself? 
(Please check only one box.) 
  Very knowledgeable 
  Relatively knowledgeable 
  Somewhat knowledgeable 
  Less than knowledgeable 
  Not at all knowledgeable 
 
9. Which of the following statements best describes how often you think about your 
retirement savings? (Please check only one box.) 
  I think about my retirement savings a great deal 
  I think about my retirement savings sometimes 
  I rarely think about my retirement savings 
  I never think about my retirement savings 
 
10. Which of the following statements best describes you?  
(Please check only one box.) 
  I never leave things to the last minute 
  I rarely leave things to the last minute 
  I sometimes leave things to the last minute 
  I often leave things to the last minute 
  I almost always leave things to the last minute 
 
11. Which of the following best describes your level of education?  
(Please check only one box.) 
  Some high school 
  High school degree 
  Some college 
  College degree 
  Some graduate school 
  Graduate school degree 
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12. What is your marital status? 
(Please check only one box.) 
  Single 
  Married 
  Separated 
  Divorced 
 
13. Imagine that you just won a $500 prize in a raffle. What would you do with your 
winnings? (Please check only one box.) 
  I would save the entire prize. 
  I would use the entire prize to pay down my debts. 
  I would spend the entire prize. 
  I would save      %, pay down debts with      %, and spend      %. 
      (These percentages should add up to 100%) 
 
14. Suppose that you decided to save an extra $1,000 of your annual income, and you had 
a financial planner who would help you do this. Where would you instruct your 
planner to make this investment? The dollar amounts below should sum to $1,000.  
(Please check all boxes that apply and fill in amounts to the right.) 
 
  The checking account at my bank or other financial institution  $            
  The savings account at my bank or other financial institution $            
  An Individual Retirement Account (IRA) $            
  My employer’s 401(k) plan $            
  A college savings account (for example, 529 plan)   $            
  A brokerage account $            
  A stock mutual fund outside a 401(k) plan $            
  A bond mutual fund outside a 401(k) plan $            
  Other (please indicate) __________________________ $            
  
15. (a) What percent of your household income do you think you should ideally be saving 
for retirement right now? If you don’t know, answer with your best guess. 
 
     % of my household income 
 
(b) What percent of your household income are you actually saving for retirement 
right now? 
 
     % of my household income 
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16. If you think you are already saving enough for retirement, check here.  
 
If not, how much more do you think you could commit to saving than you currently 
are? 
(Please check only one box.) 
  I can’t afford to save any more 
  $10 per week 
  $20 per week 
  $40 per week 
  $50 or more per week 
 
17. Suppose you decided to cut your spending by $2 a day in order to save more for 
retirement. (This comes out to saving $730 more per year.) Where would you cut 
your spending the most? 
  Food 
  Clothing 
  Entertainment 
  Alcohol/cigarettes 
   Other (please indicate) ___________________ 
 
18. About how much would your household need to have saved by the time you retire in 
order to live comfortably in retirement? 
 
I/we would need to save $_____________    I don’t know 
 
19. After you retire, do you expect your household’s monthly spending to be lower than, 
about the same as, or higher than your monthly spending right before you retire? 
(Please check only one box.) 
  Lower 
  About the same 
  Higher 
 
20. Rate each of the following investments’ riskiness on a scale of 1 to 5.  
1 indicates “no risk” and 5 indicates “very high risk.” 
 
          No risk                   Very high risk 
(a) A large US stock mutual fund   1     2     3     4     5  Don’t know 
(b) Your employer’s stock 1     2     3     4     5  Don’t know 
(c) A savings account at your bank    1     2     3     4     5  Don’t know 
(d) Bonds 1     2     3     4     5   Don’t know 
(e) Stable value/money market fund 1     2     3     4     5   Don’t know 
(f) Stock of a typical Fortune 500 company  1     2     3     4     5   Don’t know 
(g) An international stock mutual fund 1     2     3     4     5  Don’t know 
(h) An emerging markets stock mutual fund 1     2     3     4     5  Don’t know 
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SKIP THIS PAGE IF YOU’RE NOT CONTRIBUTING TO 
YOUR COMPANY 401(k) PLAN RIGHT NOW. 
 
 
21. For each of questions (a) through (d), please check the box that best describes your 
plans. 
In the next two months: 
 
(a) I plan to  raise /  lower /  maintain my 401(k) contribution rate 
(b) I  plan /  do not plan to make a withdrawal from my 401(k) plan 
(c) I  plan /  do not plan to take a loan out of my 401(k) plan 
(d) I  plan /  do not plan to change the mix of funds in which I am invested 
 
22. If you’re not planning on making any of the changes in question 21, check here.  
 
If you are planning on making some changes, when are you planning on making 
them?  
(Please check only one box.) 
 In the next few days 
 In the next week 
 In the next two weeks 
 In the next month 
 In the next two months 
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SKIP THIS PAGE IF YOU ARE CONTRIBUTING TO 
YOUR COMPANY 401(k) PLAN RIGHT NOW. 
 
23. When do you plan to begin contributing to your company’s 401(k) plan?  
(Please check only one box.) 
 In the next few days 
 In the next week 
 In the next two weeks 
 In the next month 
 In the next two months 
 In the next                 (more than two months) 
 I do not plan on ever contributing to the 401(k) plan 
 
24. If you’re not planning on ever contributing to the 401(k) plan, check here.  
 
If you are planning on contributing some day, what percent of your salary do you 
expect to contribute when you start? 
     % of my salary 
 
25. If you are planning on contributing to the 401(k) plan some day, check here.  
 
If you’re not planning on ever contributing to the 401(k) plan, what are the main 
reasons?  
(Please check all boxes that apply.) 
 I don’t want to save right now 
 I can’t afford to save right now 
 I’d rather save in accounts outside of the 401(k) 
 I don’t have enough information to know how much to save 
 I don’t understand my company’s 401(k) plan 
 It takes too long to sign up for my company’s 401(k) plan 
 There’s always a chance I might be changing jobs or retiring soon 
  My company 401(k) match isn’t high enough 
 I’m worried about the state of the stock market/financial markets 
  I’m worried about corporate scandals and accountability 
 Other. Please specify  
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In this section, you will be told some facts about your 401(k) plan.  
 
26. Your company offers its employees a matching contribution on the first 6% of salary 
contributed to their before-tax 401(k) account. When did you become aware of this 
fact? 
(Please check only one box.) 
 I just became aware of this fact 
 I may have known this fact before, but I’m not sure 
 I definitely knew this fact before 
 
27. Your company lets you make transactions in your 401(k) by using the Internet. You 
can also call a toll-free number, where you can use an automated touch-tone system 
or speak to a benefits center representative. When did you become aware of these 
facts? 
(Please check only one box.) 
 I just became aware of at least one of these facts 
 I may have known these facts before, but I’m not sure 
 I definitely knew these facts before 
 
28. If you ever need the money in your 401(k) for any reason, you can withdraw it 
without penalty once you’re over 59½ years old. You’ll pay ordinary income tax on 
any money withdrawn that hasn’t already been taxed. When did you become aware 
that penalty-free withdrawals are available? 
(Please check only one box.) 
 I just became aware of these facts 
 I may have known these facts before, but I’m not sure 
 I definitely knew these facts before 
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29. Suppose you’re contributing $0 to your before-tax 401(k) account. How much 
employer match money would you lose each year from not contributing 6% of your 
salary?  
(Use the table below to get an approximate answer. If you aren’t sure what your employer match rate 
is, use your best guess.) 
 
Example: If your salary is $30,000 and your match rate is 50%, then your annual loss is $900. 
 
I would lose $           in matching contributions every year from contributing 
0% instead of 6% of my salary to my before-tax 401(k) account. 
 
Annual employer match lost from not contributing 
Annual Employer match rate 
 Salary 0% 16.7% 25% 30% 40% 50% 60% 65% 75% 100%
$10,000 $0 $100 $150 $180 $240 $300 $360 $390 $450 $600 
$20,000 $0 $200 $300 $360 $480 $600 $720 $780 $900 $1,200
$30,000 $0 $301 $450 $540 $720 $900 $1,080 $1,170 $1,350 $1,800
$40,000 $0 $401 $600 $720 $960 $1,200 $1,440 $1,560 $1,800 $2,400
$50,000 $0 $501 $750 $900 $1,200 $1,500 $1,800 $1,950 $2,250 $3,000
$60,000 $0 $601 $900 $1,080 $1,440 $1,800 $2,160 $2,340 $2,700 $3,600
$70,000 $0 $701 $1,050 $1,260 $1,680 $2,100 $2,520 $2,730 $3,150 $4,200
$80,000 $0 $802 $1,200 $1,440 $1,920 $2,400 $2,880 $3,120 $3,600 $4,800
$90,000 $0 $902 $1,350 $1,620 $2,160 $2,700 $3,240 $3,510 $4,050 $5,400
$100,000 $0 $1,002 $1,500 $1,800 $2,400 $3,000 $3,600 $3,900 $4,500 $6,000
 
30. Does your answer to the previous question make you interested in raising your 
contribution rate to 6% so you won’t lose any more employer match money? 
 Yes. I plan to do so in the next       weeks. 
 No, I’m already contributing 6% or more before-tax to the 401(k) plan. 
 No, my losses aren’t large enough. 
 I don’t know. 
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Appendix B: Cover Letter Sent to Treatment Subjects 
Dear <Company A employee>: 
Would you like to earn $50 for about 15 minutes of your time? 
Company A wants to better understand the retirement saving and investment issues facing its 
employees. We are inviting you to participate in a survey that Company A is conducting with 
researchers from Harvard University, the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, and 
Hewitt Associates, the company that performs the recordkeeping for Company A Savings Plan. 
As a way of saying thanks in advance for your help with this effort, we’ve enclosed a dollar bill 
in this mailing. You will receive an additional $50 American Express® Gift Cheque from the 
researchers, simply by  
1) Reading the Official Gift Check Rules on the reverse side of this letter 
2) Completing the enclosed questionnaire 
3) Mailing the questionnaire with your name and current address to Hewitt Associates in 
the postage-paid envelope provided by no later than 8/27/2004 
Gift Cheques are accepted at over a million locations—virtually everywhere American Express® 
Travelers Cheques are welcome. Returning the enclosed questionnaire indicates that you’ve fully 
read and agreed to the Official Gift Check Rules. 
Your participation in the survey is important. The responses you provide, combined with those 
provided by other employees eligible to participate in Company A Savings Plan, will help the 
researchers understand the barriers to saving and investing for retirement. All gift checks will be 
mailed three weeks after the survey closing date. 
Your responses and information are completely confidential. Company A will never see your 
individual responses to the questionnaire, and answers to questions will not be used to identify 
individuals. Hewitt will report results to Company A only in aggregate form.  
We look forward to your participation!  
Sincerely, 
 
Jane Doe 
Director, Retirement Benefits 
Company A 
  
26
Official Gift Check Rules  
American Express® Gift Cheques will be awarded only to those invited to participate in this survey. American 
Express® Gift Cheques are accepted virtually everywhere American Express® Travelers Cheques are welcomed. 
For further details regarding rules, policies and limitations that may apply to the use of American Express® 
Travelers Cheques, visit “www.aeis.com/American_Express_Gift_Cheques.html” via the internet or call (888) 853-
9899. Hewitt Associates and the Researchers are not responsible for lost, late or misdirected mail. Hewitt Associates 
and the Researchers reserve the right to cancel American Express® Gift Cheque payments if the package containing 
the Cheque is returned undeliverable. 
If you have questions regarding your American Express® Gift Cheque, please write to the following address:  
 
<Address> 
 
Void where prohibited. 
 
Each participant agrees to release, indemnify, and hold harmless Hewitt Associates, and their affiliates, parents, 
subsidiaries, advertising and promotion agencies and their respective officers, directors, employees, representatives 
and agents from any and all liability for any injuries, loss or damage of any kind to any person, including death, and 
property arising in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, from acceptance, possession, use or misuse of the gift 
check as a result of participation in the survey. 
 
In no event will Hewitt Associates, their affiliates, parents, subsidiaries, advertising and promotion agencies and 
their respective officers, directors, employees, representatives and agents be responsible for any damages or losses 
of any kind, including direct, indirect, incidental, or consequential or punitive damages arising from your 
participation in the survey. All gift checks are provided without warranty of any kind, express or implied, including 
but not limited to warranties of purchases made with gift checks, fitness for a particular purpose or non-
infringement. 
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FIGURE 1.  Failure to Exploit the Full 401(k) Match
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Table 1. 401(k) Plan Rules at Seven Firms (1998) 
 Company A Company B Company C Company D Company E Company F Company G 
Eligibility Immediate Only non-union 
employees after 
1,000 hours of 
service in a year 
January 1 following 
hire 
3 months of service Non-temporary 
employees after 1 
month of service 
Salaried employees 
immediate; union 
employees after 3 
months of service 
Immediate 
Contributions Before-tax and after-
tax 
 
Before-tax and 
after-tax 
Before-tax 
 
Before-tax Before-tax and after-
tax 
Before-tax and after-
tax 
Before-tax 
Employer match 
rate 
25% to 100% match 
on first 6% of pay 
contributed 
50% match on first 
4% of pay 
contributed 
25% match on first 
3% of pay 
contributed (before-
tax contributions 
only) 
100% match on first 3% 
of pay contributed; 50% 
match on next 3% of 
pay contributed 
75% match on first 
2% of pay 
contributed; 50% 
match on next 3% of 
pay contributed 
20% to 35% match 
on first 6% of pay 
contributed 
100% match on first 
3% of pay contrib-
uted; 50% match on 
next 3% of pay 
contributed; no 
match in first year 
Match invested in 
employer stock 
Yes, diversification 
restricted 
No No Yes, diversification 
restricted 
Yes, diversification 
restricted 
Yes, diversification 
restricted 
No 
Vesting 5-year cliff 
 
5-year cliff or 
100% at age 65 
 
5-year graded from 3 
to 7 years of tenure 
or 100% at age 65 
Immediate 5-year cliff or 100% 
upon retirement at or 
after age 55 
5-year graded from 1 
to 5 years of tenure 
 
4-year graded from 
2 to 5 years of 
tenure or 100% at 
age 60 
Withdrawal 
restrictions 
$250 minimum; no 
more than 1 per 
month; order of 
account depletion:  
after tax, match, 
before tax 
No restrictions Matching 
contributions not 
available for 
withdrawal 
 
No more than 1 per 
month; order of account 
depletion: after tax, 
match (in account more 
than 2 years), before tax 
1-year contribution 
suspension after 
withdrawals from 
matched after tax 
account; match can 
only be withdrawn 
after 2 years 
$100 minimum; no 
more than 6 per year;  
order of account 
depletion: after tax, 
before tax, match 
Order of account 
depletion: match, 
before tax 
Withdrawal 
procedures 
Call toll-free number; 
checks mailed next 
week 
Call toll-free 
number; checks cut 
within 2 business 
days 
Call toll-free number;  
checks mailed in 2-3 
weeks 
Call toll-free number. 
Check processing time 
not in documents. 
Call toll-free number; 
withdrawals 
processed within 1 
week 
Call toll-free number. 
Check processing 
time not in 
documents. 
Call toll-free 
number. Check 
processing time not 
in documents. 
Source: 401(k) plan documents 
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Table 2. Demographic Characteristics at Seven Firms (1998) 
 
 Company A Company B Company C Company D Company E Company F Company G All 
Total number active employees  Over 20,000 Over 5,000 Over 50,000 Over 10,000 Over 20,000 Over 30,000 Over 10,000 Over 135,000 
Employees 59½+ eligible for 
401(k) match 
        
Fraction male (%) 91.7% 87.5% 17.0% 69.0% 73.4% 63.1% 58.9% 55.7% 
Average age (years) 62.6 69.7 64.7 62.6 62.7 63.0 63.6 65.2 
Average tenure (years) 16.0 6.3 14.4 18.4 22.5 22.2 12.1 14.3 
Median salary $32,427 $8,182 $21,559 $57,290 $40,830 $43,008 $43,711 $25,826 
401(k) participation rate 82.7% 26.4% 45.9% 96.6% 68.1% 71.9% 90.1% 53.7% 
Median 401(k) balance of 
participants 
$36,711 $2,509 $8,934 $27,080 $49,260 $62,665 $33,822 $48,063 
Number of employees 817 1,543 2,436 145 383 917 242 6,483 
Employees <59½ eligible for 
401(k) match 
        
Fraction male 81.7% 52.5% 19.2% 76.8% 70.6% 65.5% 65.9% 54.1% 
Average age (years) 43.7 38.8 41.0 43.9 42.3 43.2 39.2 42.1 
Average tenure (years) 10.9 5.2 8.0 17.6 14.1 15.3 7.7 11.5 
Median salary $32,323 $21,053 $26,719 $62,057 $38,592 $46,569 $44,843 $37,152 
401(k) participation rate 81.0% 39.3% 43.0% 96.5% 72.3% 81.0% 79.6% 67.8% 
Median 401(k) balance of 
participants 
$22,144 $4,018 $5,295 $26,013 $17,382 $34,413 $14,942 $17,679 
Number of employees 23,260 4,783 53,435 14,678 19,529 37,649 12,377 165,711 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 3. Welfare Losses, 1998:  Employees Over Age 59½  
 
Loss Calculation Approach Company A Company B Company C Company D Company E Company F Company G All 
Ex ante losses        
 
Number of ex ante undersavers 198 1,045 1,379 36 81 337 103 3,179 
Fraction ex ante undersavers 24.2% 67.7% 56.6% 24.8% 21.1% 36.8% 42.6% 49.0% 
    Fraction non-participants 53.5% 92.6% 81.7% 11.1% 55.6% 71.8% 21.4% 79.1% 
    Fraction participants < threshold 46.5% 7.4% 18.3% 88.9% 44.4% 28.2% 78.6% 21.0% 
Average ex ante undersaver loss ($) $754.91 $131.18 $155.30 $328.35 $678.68 $540.79 $633.22 $256.36 
Average ex ante undersaver loss  
(% of pay) 
2.24% 1.64% 0.77% 1.02% 1.95% 1.67% 1.50% 1.30% 
Aggregate match dollars foregone 
(% of maximum match available) 
11.9% 62.7% 41.0% 3.1% 10.4% 18.1% 12.2% 18.4% 
Ex post losses         
Number of ex post undersavers 212 1,153 1,580 36 81 344 114 3,520 
Fraction ex post undersavers 25.9% 74.7% 64.9% 24.8% 21.1% 37.5% 47.1% 54.3% 
    Fraction non-participants 55.2% 92.8% 82.4% 11.1% 55.6% 71.2% 21.1% 79.7% 
    Fraction participants < threshold 44.8% 7.2% 17.6% 88.9% 44.4% 28.8% 78.9% 20.3% 
Average ex post undersaver loss ($) $756.41 $136.17 $168.88 $328.35 $678.68 $550.48 $616.88 $258.72 
Average ex post undersaver loss 
(% of pay) 
2.29% 1.68% 0.82% 1.02% 1.95% 1.69% 1.47% 1.32% 
Aggregate match dollars foregone 
(% of maximum match available) 
12.4% 62.7% 43.4% 3.1% 10.4% 18.4% 11.8% 19.4% 
Source: Authors’ calculations. The sample is employees age 59½ and older who are eligible to receive a 401(k) matching contribution. See the text for the definition of ex ante 
and ex post undersavers and a description of how their welfare losses are calculated. The numbers in this table account for incomplete vesting and the potential to incur capital 
gains taxes if withdrawals are made from after-tax accounts. 
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Table 4. Foregone Employer Matching Contributions, 1998: Comparing Employees Younger and Older Than 59½  
 
 Company A Company B Company C Company D Company E Company F Company G All 
Employees age ≥59½         
Number of sub-match savers 250 1,234 1,598 52 81 344 114 3,673 
Fraction sub-match savers 30.6% 80.0% 65.6% 35.9% 21.1% 37.5% 47.1% 56.7% 
    Fraction non-participants 56.4% 91.4% 82.5% 9.6% 55.6% 71.2% 21.1% 79.1% 
    Fraction participants < threshold 43.6% 8.6% 17.5% 90.4% 44.4% 28.8% 78.9% 20.9% 
Average sub-match saver loss ($) $736.89 $136.38 $177.20 $290.72 $678.68 $550.48 $616.88 $262.86 
Average sub-match saver loss 
(% of pay) 
2.31% 1.66% 0.86% 0.93% 1.95% 1.69% 1.47% 1.35% 
Aggregate match dollars foregone  
(% of maximum match available) 
13.7% 64.5% 44.4% 3.9% 10.4% 18.4% 11.8% 20.2% 
Employees age <59½          
Fraction sub-match savers 37.8% 80.8% 74.1% 47.2% 32.4% 38.5% 66.7% 53.9% 
    Fraction non-participants 50.0% 74.7% 76.9% 7.4% 46.4% 44.2% 30.5% 47.2% 
    Fraction participants < threshold 50.0% 25.3% 23.1% 92.6% 53.6% 55.8% 69.5% 52.8% 
Average sub-match saver loss ($) $806.24 $259.94 $207.25 $501.69 $669.42 $586.01 $874.42 $450.11 
Average sub-match saver loss 
(% of pay) 
2.44% 1.33% 0.84% 1.00% 1.88% 1.35% 2.01% 1.30% 
Aggregate match dollars foregone 
(% of maximum match available) 
16.5% 48.2% 51.9% 8.3% 16.4% 20.5% 24.0% 26.6% 
Source: Authors’ calculations. The sample is all employees eligible to receive the 401(k) match. Sub-match savers are all such employees not contributing up to the match 
threshold in the 401(k) plan (including non-participants). The numbers in this table do not account for incomplete vesting and the potential to incur capital gains taxes if 
withdrawals are made from after-tax accounts (see text for details). 
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Table 5. Predictors of Foregoing Employer Matching Contributions 
 
Dependent variable 
Ex ante undersaver Ex post undersaver Sub-match saver 
Sample: ≥59 ½ Sample: ≥59 ½ Sample: ≥59 ½ Sample: <59 ½ 
 
 
 
Independent 
variables 
Coefficient Slope Coefficient Slope Coefficient Slope Coefficient Slope 
Male 0.1580** 0.0630** 0.1913** 0.0755** 0.2077** 0.0805** 0.1155** 0.0456** 
 (0.0454) (0.0180) (0.0466) (0.0183) (0.0474) (0.0184) (0.0080) (0.0032) 
Married -0.1033** -0.0412** -0.1311** -0.0517** -0.1688** -0.0654** -0.1170** -0.0461** 
 (0.0417) (0.0166) (0.0427) (0.0168) 0.0431 (0.0167) (0.0076) (0.0030) 
Age 0.0644** 0.0257** 0.0401** 0.0158** 0.0257** 0.0100** -0.0085** -0.0034** 
 (0.0046) (0.0018) (0.0047) (0.0019) (0.0048) (0.0019) (0.0004) (0.0002) 
Log(Tenure) 0.0662** 0.0264** -0.1575** -0.0621** -0.2960** -0.1147** -0.2028** -0.0801** 
 (0.0217) (0.0086) (0.0223) (0.0088) (0.0236) (0.0091) (0.0043) (0.0017) 
Log(Salary) -0.4786** -0.1909** -0.6295** -0.2483** -0.7135** -0.2765** -0.7390** -0.2919** 
 (0.0249) (0.0099) (0.0280) (0.0110) (0.0304) (0.0116) (0.0073) (0.0029) 
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample Size N = 6,481 N = 6,481 N = 6,481 N = 165,651 
Source: Authors’ calculations. This table presents the results of a probit regression for the likelihood of foregoing employer matching contributions in 
1998 (see text for the definitions of undersavers and sub-match savers). The sample is restricted to 401(k)-match-eligible employees. Male and Married 
are dummies set to one if the participant is male and married, respectively. Age is the participant’s age on December 31, 1998. Tenure is the number of 
years since the participant’s original hire date as of December 31, 1998. Salary is the participant’s annualized salary in 1998. Firm fixed effects are 
included, although their coefficients are not reported. The columns labeled “Coefficient” present coefficient estimates from the probits. The columns 
labeled “Slope” present marginal effects evaluated at the means of the explanatory variables. The marginal effect reported for the dummy variables is 
the effect of changing the variables from 0 to 1. Standard errors are in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 5% level. ** denotes significance at the 
1% level. 
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Table 6. Field Experiment Results 
 
  
Control group 
 
Treatment group 
t-statistic of 
difference 
Pre-survey contribution rate 1.73% 1.48% 1.38 
Post-survey contribution rate 1.81% 1.64% 0.86 
Change (post-pre) 0.08% 0.16% 0.86 
Sample size N = 341 N = 337 — 
Source: Authors’ calculations. This table shows the average 401(k) contribution rates on August 1, 2004 (pre-survey) and 
November 1, 2004 (post-survey) for Company A employees contributing under the match threshold at the beginning of 
August 2004. The last column gives the t-statistic for the null that there is no difference between the two groups. 
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Endnotes 
1 That is, they can withdraw money for any reason. In particular, they do not have to 
document financial hardship in order to access their balances. 
2 The 10% (federal) tax penalty on early 401(k) withdrawals only applies to employees 
under the age of 59 ½, and our sample only includes companies that allow employees to 
make 401(k) withdrawals without jeopardizing their ability to make future contributions 
to the 401(k) plan. 
3 That is, they can withdraw money from the company-sponsored 401(k) while still 
employed at the firm. 
4 For the one company at which at which the field experiment was conducted, we have 
additional cross-sectional snapshots for August 1, 2004 and November 1, 2004. 
5 Calculations available upon request from authors. 
6 We could alternatively identify undersavers using the year-end contribution rate in the 
cross-sectional data. We choose not to do this because employees can change their 
contribution rate throughout the year, so the year-end contribution rate (which is a point-
in-time measure) may not accurately indicate the matching contributions the employee 
received throughout the year. 
7 Because the match threshold for employees in our sample does not exceed 6%, the 
$10,000 contribution limit does not in practice constrain any employees from receiving 
the full employer match specified under their plan rules once the $160,000 compensation 
limit is accounted for.  
8 These employees may still realize some tax benefit if they participate in the 401(k). 
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9 Because we only observe an employee’s total contributions for a calendar year, we 
assume that the contribution rate was constant throughout that year. 
10 In Company C, there are four employees for whom we cannot calculate ex post losses 
in the conventional manner because they are not fully vested as of year-end 2002, which 
is when our data end. For these employees, we predict their probability of leaving in 
future years from a probit model on the probability of leaving for all Company C 
employees in the 1998-2002 data. We then use this predicted probability of leaving in our 
calculation of the expected ex post loss for these four employees. The dependent variable 
in this regression is whether the employee left the company in the year following the data 
snapshot. The explanatory variables used are gender, marital status, age, the log of tenure, 
and the log of salary. Because these four employees represent only 0.06% of our total 
59½+ sample, they have a negligible impact on our results. 
11 Companies A, D, E, and F. 
12 Several papers calculate discounts for portfolios that are partially invested in employer 
stock (Poterba (2003), Meulbroek (2002), and Brennan and Torous (1999)). 
Paradoxically, Benartzi, et al. (2004) report that 20% of their survey respondents would 
prefer $1,000 of employer stock which they could not diversify until age 50 to $1,000 
invested without restrictions.  
13 52% of ex ante undersavers and 53% of ex post undersavers have never participated in 
their company’s 401(k) plan. 
14 The group of ex ante and ex post undersavers as we have been defining them will be a 
subset of the sub-match savers.  
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15 Firms are not required to allow employees to make hardship withdrawals, although 
many do so.  There are some limited circumstances under which employees younger than 
59 ½ can withdraw 401(k) balances without incurring a 10% tax penalty.  These include 
permanent disability, a court order pursuant to a divorce, medical expenditures in excess 
of 7.5% of income, and some specific cases of early retirement or following a permanent 
layoff.  Home purchase, education, or general financial hardship do not exempt 
employees from paying a tax penalty on early withdrawals. 
16 We also mailed surveys to 4000 employees below the age of 59½.  Results from those 
respondents are available on request. 
17 Budget constraints precluded us from offering a $50 Gift Cheque to all respondents. 
Assignment to the Gift Cheque and raffle groups was random, and comparing the 
characteristics (age, compensation, tenure, participation in the 401(k) plan) of employees 
who received these different response incentives suggests that the two groups are indeed 
very similar. 
18 There were three raffle winners, one for each of the prizes. 
19For employees older than 59½ and contributing below the match threshold, the response 
rate was 24% among those receiving the $50 American Express Gift Cheque and 11% 
among those entered into the raffle. 
 
20 Despite these stated convictions about optimal savings rates, only 30% of those under 
the threshold and 47% of those at or above the threshold were able to give an answer in 
Question 18 about how much wealth they would need to live comfortably in retirement. 
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21 See John Hancock Financial Services (2002) and Benartzi et al. (2004) for the results 
from other surveys asking similar questions. 
22 Laibson (1997), O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999), and Choi, et al. (2004b) analyze 
models in which time-inconsistent preferences lead people to undersave and 
procrastinate. 
23 This is larger than the average ex post loss of $756 reported in Table 3 for Company A. 
However, the $1,200 median response to Question 29 was calculated relative to not 
participating in the 401(k) plan. A comparable calculation using data from 1998 on 
individuals contributing below the match threshold or not all gives a median loss of $991. 
The remainder of the discrepancy is likely accounted for by increases in salaries between 
1998 and 2004.   
24 There are fewer than 689 employees in the table because some employees left the 
company before November 1, 2004. 
25 7 members of the control group increased their contribution rate, while 8 members of 
the treatment did. 1 control and no treatment group members decreased their contribution 
rate over this same period. 
